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INTRODUCTION 
A new and exciting breed of the grand jury system has 
emerged in East Asia: Japan introduced the revised system of 
Prosecution Review Commissions (“PRCs”) in 2009 and the 
People’s Republic of China implemented the System of People’s 
Supervisor in 2010. Contrary to the United States’ grand jury 
system, which has often been criticized as the government’s 
rubber stamp institution or even labeled as the “laughingstock” 
of US criminal procedure,1 these two new citizen panels adopted 
in two of the most powerful countries in East Asia have begun to 
transform their legal landscape by giving ordinary people the 
authority to monitor and check government and corporate 
decisions and activities. These oversight institutions have also 
begun to initiate forced prosecution of unethical actions and 
illegal conduct of government officials, industrialists, economic 
elites, and even foreign soldiers stationed in the country. 
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part I examines 
Japan’s revised PRC system and how its implementation 
facilitated the forced prosecution of a political powerbroker, 
past presidents of Japan’s powerful corporations, a government 
bureaucrat, and US military personnel stationed in Japan. The 
historical genealogy of China’s People’s Supervisor System 
(“PSS”) is the focus of Part II. Part III examines specific criminal 
cases reviewed and assessed by the grand juries in both countries. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, many East and Central Asian 

1. Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV., 2333, 2352 
(2008). 
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countries began to introduce a new system of lay participation in 
criminal justice procedure. Active participation of citizens in the 
justice system and the new civic oversight of government 
agencies and corporate elites can lead to even further 
transparency of judicial systems in East Asia. Part IV then 
examines the socio-political ramifications of these new systems 
in Japan and China and makes critical suggestions to improve 
the representativeness of civic panels and the quality of their 
deliberations. 
I. HISTORICAL GENEALOGY OF THE PRCS IN JAPAN 
A. The Evolution of Japan’s PRC and Its Development 
The birth of Japan’s grand jury system began with the 
occupation of the Japanese islands by the Allied Forces 
immediately following the end of World War II (“WWII”) in 
1945. Through the joint collaborative work of the Japanese 
government and the Allied Forces represented by the US 
government, the civilian review commission was established by 
the passage of the Prosecutorial Review Commission Law on July 
12, 1948.2 The PRC is the Japanese version of a US-style grand 
jury system. As the leader of the office of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (the “SCAP”) occupying 
Japan after WWII, General Douglas McArthur saw the grand jury 
as an important democratic institution for engaging the public 
whose rights had been deliberately neglected by the Japanese 
government until the end of WWII. 
The original proposal to establish the grand jury system in 
Japan was specified in the Proposed Revision of Code of 
Criminal Procedure, written by Captain Maniscalco of the Legal 
Section, Public Safety Division of the SCAP in 1946. 3  This 
proposal also included the provision to introduce the petit jury 
in Japan, although Japan already had its own system of jury trial 

2. Kensatsu Shinsakai Ho [Prosecution Review Commission Law], Law No. 147 of 
1948, art. 4 (Japan) [hereinafter PRC Law]. 
3. ANNA DOBROVOLSKAIA, JAPAN’S PAST EXPERIENCES WITH THE INSTITUTION OF 
JURY SERVICE, 48–49 n.233 (2010) (unpublished manuscript on file with East Asia Law 
Review) (discussing the history of revisions of implementing both the grand and petit 
jury system in Japan). The paper was presented at the Inaugural East Asia Law and 
Society Conference in Hong Kong in February 2010. 
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that began in 1928 but was suspended in 1943 due to the war.4 
The second attempt to establish the grand jury system was 
included in the informal directive from the SCAP to the 
Japanese government, and the draft of the new Court 
Organization Law was given to the Japanese side by Alfred C. 
Oppler, Chief Officer of the Legal Unit, Governmental Powers 
Division, in 1947.5 
Specifically, Article 227 of the proposed revised code of 
criminal procedure stated that: 
[N]o accused shall be made to answer (stand public action) 
for any crime the penalty for which may be confinement for 
one year or more, or for life, or an indefinite period, or 
death, unless an indictment or presentment made by a 
grand jury,” followed by the note that “Rules governing 
selection, session etc. of grand juries should be 
promulgated.6 
Article 228 also specified, “[n]o indictment shall be found, nor 
shall presentment be made, without the concurrence of at least 
ten jurors (of a panel of 12).”7 However, Captain Maniscalco’s 
proposal was submitted to the Japanese government as a private 
draft, and his provisions regarding the jury system were not 
formally included as part of the final draft of the official SCAP 
recommendation.8 
It is important to note that there was a significant 
difference of opinions among the various sections of the SCAP 
on the recommendations of civic participation systems. Legal 
specialist Anna Dobrovolskaia indicated that Alfred C. Oppler 
and his associate Thomas L. Blakemore became highly critical of 
Maniscalco’s proposals, expressing their grave concerns about 
the unilateral, authoritative imposition of the US lay 
participation system on post-war Japan. 9  Blakemore, in 
particular, had a unique perspective on Japanese legal ethos and 

4. See DOBROLSKAIA, supra note 3, at 48 n.231. 
5. Id. at 48 n.231. 
6. Id. at 49. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 50 n.240. 
9. Id. at 50 n.241 (citing NOBUYOSHI TOSHITANI, SENGO KAIKAKU TO KOKUMIN NO 
SHIHO SANKA [POST-WAR REFORMS AND PEOPLE’S JUSTICE [SYSTEM] PARTICIPATION], 
127 (1975)) (discussing this draft as a document prepared by Captain Maniscalco in 
the private capacity). 
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culture, as he had formerly studied Japanese law in pre-war 
Japan at the Tokyo Imperial University. After Blakemore 
graduated from the University of Oklahoma, he received a grant 
to study in Japan and came to Tokyo in 1939 as a student of 
international law and language.10 After he passed the Japanese 
bar exam, he was also admitted to practice law with full 
courtroom status in Japan.11 
Blakemore returned to Japan as the Chief of Civil Affairs 
and Civil Liberties Branch, Legislation, and Justice Division, 
Legal Section under the SCAP. Blakemore proposed a radically 
different version of the US grand jury system to his Japanese 
counterpart.12 As Blakemore was highly critical of Maniscalco’s 
original proposal, his new proposal laid the foundation for the 
creation of the PRC, in order to check and even challenge the 
prosecution’s discretion when it decides not to prosecute.13 
Blakemore’s proposed model radically departed from the 
traditional Anglo-American criminal grand jury system. Rather 
than relying on people’s discretion to make an indictment 
decision based on prosecutorial evidence, the chief function of 
Japan’s counterpart is to allow Japanese citizens to review a 
prosecutor’s “failure” to indict criminal suspects. In other 
words, Japan’s proposed grand jury panel was designed to 
function as the people’s effective oversight institution for 
prosecutors’ decisions and investigative authorities. Given the 
fact that nearly one hundred percent of all indictments lead to 
conviction in Japan,14 the PRC’s ex post facto review of non-
indictment decisions became quite significant in checking any 
potential governmental abuse and misuse of power and 
authority. 

10. Mary F. Pols, Thomas Blakemore Spent His Life Connecting America and Japan, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 1, 1994, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.
com/archive/?date=19940301&slug=1897785 (recounting Blakemore’s life and 
influence on Japan). 
11 . JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
PARADOX 126 n.12 (1991). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So 
High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53 (2001) (“Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 
percent.”). 
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Thanks to Blakemore’s suggestion to create the effective 
civic oversight of governmental actions, the PRC became a 
powerful hybrid institution, which more or less mirrored the 
United States’ civil grand jury as exercised in the State of 
California. The civil grand jury is empanelled every year at every 
county in California to examine civic complaints against 
government officials.  The grand jury also inspects the actions 
and decision of public personnel and the proper management 
of local government offices, including the school board, the 
public library, the prosecutor’s office, the police department, 
and local jails.15 Similar to the US criminal grand jury, the PRC 
also has influence on decisions to indict.16 
Ever since the PRC was established at 201 locations 
throughout Japan in 1948, the PRC has deliberated on a total of 
162,233 cases (as of December 31, 2012).17 Not only has the PRC 
deliberated on many controversial political issues, but its 
examination has also extended to prominent white-collar crimes 
and allegations of egregious governmental misconduct related 
to deaths, injuries, torts, and other sensitive health-related 
matters. 18  For example, the PRC’s examination has covered 
cases such as the Japan Airlines Flight 123 crash,19 the Snow 

15. See generally Hiroshi Fukurai, The Proposal to Establish the System of the 
Federal Civil Grand Jury in America (May 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
16. Editorial, Keeping an Eye on Prosecution, JAPAN TIMES, May 19, 2009, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2009/05/19/editorials/keeping-an-eye-on-prosecution
/#.UzPOi61dXt8. 
17. Supreme Court of Japan, Kensatsu Shinsakai no Juri Kensu: Giketsu Kensuto 
[Accepted Case Total by Prosecution Review Commission and Total Number of 
Deliberation] (2013), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/vcms_lf/kensintoukei
H24.pdf. 
18. See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury 
Systems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory Experience 
in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 315, 349–53 (2007) (discussing how Japan’s 
HIV contamination incident is historically rooted in the germ and biological warfare 
experiments conducted by Unit 731 military doctors during WWII, who later played 
prominent roles in the development of Japan’s pharmaceutical industries and the 
formulation of health-related government policies). 
19. Shouwashi Saibo-Nikko Janboki Tuiraku Jiken [Revisit Showa’s History: Japan Airline 
Crash], ASAHI DIGITAL (Aug. 12, 1985, 9:38 AM), http://www.asahi.com/culture/
articles/TKY201308030404.html. 
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Brand mass food poisoning case, 20  the Minamata mercury 
poisoning incident, an organ transplant from a brain dead 
donor,21 thalidomide scandals,22 incidents where hemophiliacs 
contracted HIV from contaminated blood products, 23  drug-
induced sufferings of millions of Japanese who contracted the 
Hepatitis C virus from unheated pharmaceutical products 
previously approved by the government,24 and illegal campaign 
donations and political bribery.25 The PRC also deliberated on 
international cases, such as a collision incident between Japan 
Coast Guard patrol vessels and a Chinese fishing trawler in the 
much-disputed territorial waters of the Senkakku Islands,26 and 
murders of Japanese citizens by on-duty American military 
personnel, thereby assessing the propriety of prosecuting 
foreign soldiers in Japanese court.27 
The PRC investigates its cases and has the power to 
summon petitioners, their proxies, and witnesses for 
examination; question prosecutors, asking them for additional 
information when necessary; and seek special expert advice on a 
given case.28 The investigative function only begins after a public 
complaint is filed against a prosecutor’s decision not to indict. 

20. Prosecutors Hit in Snow Probe: Failure to Indict Execs Prompts Inquest Report Barbs, 
JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2002/04/26/national/
prosecutors-hit-in-snow-probe/#.U2UOOq1dUqY. 
21 . Mayumi Negishi, Legal Restrictions, Donor Card Problems Hinder Organ 
Transplants, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998. 
22 . Kensatsushinsakai ni Tsuite, 4, Kensatsu Shinsakai Toriatsukaishinsajikensū to 
Omona Yūmeijiken [Numbers of PRC Deliberations and Famous Cases], http://www.rui.jp/
ruinet.html?=200&c=400&m=246309 (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
23 . Yukio Edano, Yakugai Eizujiken no Kensatsu Shinsakai ‘Fukisofuto’ Giketsuni 
Kansuru Shitsumon Shuisho [Main Questions Regarding PRC’s “Non-Indictment is Improper” 
Resolution on HIV Phytotoxicity Cases], SHITSUMON HONBUN JOHO [INFO. ON CONTENT OF 
INQUIRIES] (Dec. 17, 1996), http://www.shugiin.go.jp/Internet/itdb_shitsumona.nsf/
html/shitsumon/a139007.htm. 
24. Fukurai, supra note 18, at 349–53. 
25. Id. at 347–49. 
26. Motonari Imaseki, The Increased Power of Committees for the Inquest of Prosecution: 
The Implications of ‘Not Guilty’ Judgments in Mandatory Indictment Cases, YOMIURI 
SHIMBUN, Apr. 1, 2013, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/wol/dy/opinion/society_
130401.htm. 
27. Hiroshi Fukurai, Lay Prosecution of U.S. Military Crimes in Japan by Prosecutorial 
Review Commissions and the Saiban-in Trial, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN ERA OF 
TRANSITION 131 (Tom Ginsburg & Harry Scheiber eds., 2012). 
28. Keijisoshōhōtō no ichibu o kaiseisuruhōritsu [Act to Revise the Code of 
Criminal Procedure], Law No. 62 of 2004, art. 38 (Japan) [hereinafter PRC Act], 
available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO147.html. 
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Individuals and civic organizations are empowered to file these 
complaints to launch an investigation of prosecutorial decisions 
in criminal matters. 
The PRC deliberates on the case and submits one of three 
recommendations: (1) the non-indictment is proper, supporting 
the prosecutor’s original decision; (2) the non-indictment is 
improper, questioning and challenging the prosecutor’s 
decision; or (3) the indictment is proper, reversing the 
prosecutor’s non-indictment decision. A simple majority is 
needed for either of the first two decisions, while a 
supermajority of at least eight of the eleven votes is needed to 
pass the third resolution. The PRC then delivers a written 
recommendation to the Prosecutor’s Office. In the past, because 
the Prosecutor’s Office was the only institution with the power 
to indict, the PRC’s recommendations were regarded as 
advisory. This limited legal authority was finally expanded by the 
2004 Act to Revise the Code of Criminal Procedure (“PRC 
Act”), which made PRCs decisions legally binding.29 
Since nearly all indictments issued by Japanese prosecutors 
result in conviction, the most likely abuse of prosecutorial power 
lies in the exercise of the discretion not to prosecute potential 
suspects or criminals. The prosecutor’s refusal to issue 
indictments may be influenced by extra-judicial pressures from 
prominent politicians, governmental leaders, economic elites, or 
other corporate leaders in the commercial and governmental 
establishment. The PRC’s power to review and challenge the 
prosecutor’s non-indictment decision has become a potential 
tool of the citizenry to ensure the proper functioning of 
powerful corporations, local and central government agencies, 
and their officials. 
B. The Impact of the 2004 PRC Act and Legally Binding Authority 
Ever since the Prosecution Review Commission Law (“PRC 
Law”) was put into practice in 1948, the Japanese Federation of 
Bar Associations (the “JFBA”) has insisted that a PRC decision 
be given legally binding authority, instead of treating it as a 
mere advisement to the Japanese prosecutor. In order to make a 
strong case for their recommendation, the JFBA first decided to 

29. Id. art. 41(6)(1). 
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create the Internal Investigative Committee in 1973. 30  The 
Committee finally submitted its recommendation to the JFBA 
headquarters, which then released its report in 1975.31 
Committee Chair Kashitaro Idei declared in his report that 
“citizens’ direct participation in the justice system promotes the 
democratization of the judiciary, and any proposal to develop 
and strengthen the power of the PRCs system becomes an 
integral part of democratic efforts.” 32  Chair Idei’s report 
indicated that the second PRC decision to indict should be 
legally binding. Specifically, the recommendations indicated 
that after the PRC decides that “the indictment was proper” or 
“the non-indictment was improper,” the prosecutor is required 
to determine whether or not to maintain their non-indictment 
decision and then respond to the PRC recommendation within 
three months. If the prosecutor once again decided not to indict 
the suspect, the prosecutor is required to explain the reason for 
their non-indictment decision to the PRC.33 If the PRC is not 
persuaded by the prosecutor’s explanation and determines that 
the suspect should still be indicted for the given case, its second 
indictment decision becomes binding.34 The report concludes 
that prosecutors must respect the PRC decision and initiate a 
public action against the accused. 
The committee report also included the special voting rule 
and suggested that a two-thirds majority was sufficient for the 
second indictment decision. Additionally, the report suggested a 
new deliberative structure for the PRC and the replacement of 
the quota system with a quorum rule. The PRC Law required 
that the deliberative forum must consist of eleven members. The 
forum often failed to meet its required quota for deliberation 
because PRC members often faced work-related obligations, 
transportation difficulties, economic hardship, needs of care for 
children or sick family members, and/or other personal 
difficulties. The JFBA thus recommended that the size of the 

30. JAPANESE FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, KENSATSU SHINSAKAI SEIDO NO KAISEIAN:SONO 
JŪJITSU KYŌKA WO MEZASHITE [THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE PROSECUTORIAL 
REVIEW COMMISSION: TO ENRICH AND STRENGTHEN] (1975). 
31. Id. at 1. 
32. Id. at “Jobun” [Introduction]. 
33. Id. at 28–29. 
34. Id. at 29. 
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PRC be expanded from eleven to fifteen, and that the PRC 
adopt a quorum rule so that the attendance of any eleven 
members would constitute a quorum for full deliberative 
discussions and decisions.35 
In consideration of the three options for the PRC’s final 
decision, the report recommended that two of them, specifically 
“the indictment is proper” and “the non-indictment is 
improper,” should be treated equally, and the passage of this 
first PRC indictment decision should require a special two-thirds 
vote (i.e., at least eight of eleven votes). A second decision 
regarding the indictment then requires a two-thirds majority of 
the newly constituted fifteen members, which means that at least 
ten votes are needed to make the indictment legally binding.36 
Unfortunately, none of the JFBA’s recommendations were 
introduced into the legislative process, and its recommendations 
for strengthening the PRC and its power to reverse the 
prosecutorial decision were not discussed until the late 1990s. A 
window of opportunity to revise the PRC Law came again when 
the Justice System Reform Council (the “JSRC”) was created in 
1999, and it began to discuss the introduction of another lay 
justice institution, the quasi-jury system, called a Saiban-in Seido.37 
It is important to note that the revision of the PRC Law was 
never the primary objective of the JSRC’s discussions. Attorney 
Shunsuke Marushima, who once served as Senior Staff of the 
Secretariat in the JSRC, argued that many of the reforms in the 
criminal justice system, especially with respect to prosecution 
and police procedures, were expected to go through significant 
and perhaps unprecedented levels of procedural and 
administrative changes because of ordinary citizens’ 
participation in Saiban-in trials, but not the PRC deliberation.38  
For instance, the effort to revise the PRC Law was first 

35. Id. at 16–17. 
36. Id. at 18–19. 
37. Hiroshi Fukurai, People’s Panel vs. Imperial Hegemony: Japan’s Twin Lay Justice 
Systems and the Future of American Military Bases in Japan, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 95, 
123–24 (2010). 
38 . Shunsuke Marushima, Historical Genealogy of Japan’s Judicial Reform: Its 
Achievement and Challenges, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 349, 357 (2013). 
2014] PEOPLE'S GRAND JURY PANELS 939 
mentioned in the JSRC’s seventh meeting in November 1999.39 
However, it took another year and a half to have the second 
discussion on the revision of the PRC Law. On April 10, 2001, 
the fifty-fifth meeting finally discussed the PRC reform and 
evaluated different strategies and proposals from the JSRC, the 
JFBA, the Supreme Court, and the Ministry of Justice. JSRC 
members proposed to make two decisions—“non-indictment is 
improper” and “indictment is proper”—legally binding. 40 
However, the Ministry of Justice recommended that only the 
resolution of “indictment is proper” should be given legally 
binding authority, while the Supreme Court recommended that 
the resolution of “non-indictment is improper,” should be 
binding when the decision is unanimous. The JFBA’s proposal 
indicated that the PRC’s indictment decision should be legally 
binding and subject to a two-thirds voting requirement and that 
the PRC deliberation should also be assisted by a practicing 
attorney as a legal advisor.41 
The final JSRC proposal made a strong pitch for the 
revision of the PRC Law, stating that “a system should be 
introduced that grants legally binding effect to certain 
resolutions . . . in order to further expand the role of those 
Inquests [i.e., PRC], after thoroughly considering the structure, 
authority and procedures . . . as well as who files the indictment 
and conducts the prosecution at trial.”42 The Lay Assessor/Penal 
Matter Investigation Committee (the “Penal Matter 
Committee”) was soon empanelled to undertake the actual 
revision of the PRC Law. Committee Chairman Masahito Inoue 
first presented a detailed outline, suggesting that the PRC’s 
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39. Shih9, 357 kaikaku shingikai: Dai 7 kai giji gaiy  [JSRC: No. 7 Proceeding 
Outline] (Nov. 24 1999), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/991126
dai7.html. 
40. Shihleido kaikaku shingikai: Dai 55 kai giji gaiy  [JSRC: No. 55 Proceeding 
Outline] (Apr. 10, 2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai55/
55gaiyou.html. 
41. Kensat sushinsakai no itteino giketsu ni taishi haishi kaishi i o fuyshi tameno 
hameno: Hame sansha no iken no hikaku [The Strategy to Provide a Legally 
Mandatory Status to a Particular Resolution by the PRC: Comparisons of Three Legal 
Professional Groups] (Apr. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Strategy], available at http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai55/55bessi2.html. 
42. Justice Sys. Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform 
Council: For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century (2001), available 
athttp://japan.kantei.go.jp/judiciary/2001/0612report.html. 
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decision be legally binding and that a practicing attorney be 
included as a legal advisor.43 The PRC foreperson was then 
advised to specify the nature of a legal advisor’s support, 
including the explanation of legal issues, relevant evidence, and 
case-specific information to be considered in the deliberation.44 
Public opinion and feedback on the Committee’s proposals 
and guidelines were solicited in April and May 2003.45 Many 
grassroots activists and concerned citizens sent their opinions 
and suggestions to the committee website. In July, public 
suggestions, concerns, and recommendations were published in 
a 293-page report on the government website.46 Some citizens 
complained about the failure to recruit a sufficient number of 
lay participants for the commission to convene47 and the PRC’s 
automatic disqualification of vision or hearing impaired 
candidates. 48  A woman from Tokyo suggested the need for 
serious media efforts to publicize the PRC and its duty more 
broadly.49 A man in his thirties from Tokyo also suggested that 
the legally binding authority should only be granted if another 
PRC panel that deliberated on the same case reached the same 
conclusion.50 
The institutional response was equally strong. Regional bar 
associations in Osaka, Kagoshima, Kyushu, Tokyo, Nagasaki, 
Nagasaki, Fukuoka, and Kyoto submitted their opinions, 
detailed proposals, and recommendations for the PRC reform.51 
Other organizations sending their suggestions and proposals 
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43. Chairman Inouye submitted his outline for reform on November 11, 2003. 
Kangaerareru Kensatsu Shinsakai Seido Kaisei no Gaiyo ni Tsuite [The Outline on the 
PRC’s Reform to Consider] (Nov. 11, 2003), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai29/29siryou1.pdf. 
44. Id. at 2–3. 
45. Office for the Promotion of Justice Sys. Reform, Saiban-in Seido oyobi 
Kensatsu Shinsakai Seido ni Tsuiteno Ikenboshu no Kekka ni tsuite [Results of Public 
Opinions on the Lay Assessor and PRC Systems] (July 2003), available at http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/siryou/0307kekka.html. 
46. Saiban-in seido oyobi kensatsu shinsakai ni tsuiteno iken boshu no kekka gaiyo 
[Resulting outlines of public opinions on the lay assessor and PRC systems] 9 (July 
2003), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai22/
22siryou1.pdf. 
47. Id. at 327. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 159. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 176. 
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included the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the 
Japanese Housewives Association (the Shufuren), the Burakumin 
Liberation League (the Buraku Kaiho Domei), the National 
Consumer Groups Liaison Committee, the Tokyo Headquarters 
of the Women’s Conference (the Joshi Kaigi), the Japan 
Broadcasting Union, the Japan Commercial Broadcasters 
Association, the Japan Federation of Certified Administrative 
Procedures Legal Specialists Associations, teachers’ unions in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the All Judicial Labor Union (the 
Zenshijo Rodokumiai), and many other powerful and prominent 
organizations.52 Legal scholars and research institutes also sent 
their specific suggestions and proposals, including the Research 
Committee in Criminal Justice at the Nippon University School 
of Law.53 The majority of these organizations supported the 
granting of legally binding authority to the PRC’s resolution. 
The JFBA and the Citizens Committee for the Creation of a Lay 
Assessor System, an influential civic group, opposed and 
criticized any proposal to impose a penalty on PRCs members 
for divulging case-specific information, but both strongly 
supported the idea that the PRCs’ resolutions should be legally 
binding. 54 The Penal Matter Committee reviewed and 
incorporated the public comments and submitted its final 
recommendation. The PRC Law was then finally revised on May 
28, 2004.55 
The revised law created a two-step process by which a PRC 
resolution would be made legally binding. When prosecutors 
issue a decision not to indict in a given case and the PRC 
decides that indictment is in fact appropriate, prosecutors are 
obliged to reconsider their non-indictment decision. If 
prosecutors decide for a second time not to prosecute, or if they 
do not indict within three months, the prosecutors will be asked 
to explain their inaction or non-indictment decision to the 
commission.56 The PRC will then reconsider the case and if it 
makes a decision to indict, this decision becomes legally 
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52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. PRC Act, supra note 28. 
56. Id. art. 41(2)(2), (6)(2). 
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binding.57 The court also appoints an attorney to perform the 
prosecution’s role until a ruling is reached,58 but the actual 
instruction to investigate authorities will be entrusted to 
prosecutors.59 
The revised law also requires that a practicing attorney is 
appointed as a “legal advisor” when the PRC decides that legal 
knowledge and advice is necessary.60 The role of a legal advisor 
becomes particularly relevant in the second step of the process, 
when the commission may need to reevaluate the prosecutors’ 
second refusal to issue the indictment against the accused.61 
Finally, in order to streamline the operation, the PRC Law 
reduced the number of commissions from 201 to 165.62 While 
Japan was going through their own judicial reform and revising 
the PRC Law, China was undertaking similar steps to create and 
implement their own system of grand juries. 
II. HISTORICAL GENEALOGY OF CHINA’S PEOPLE’S 
SUPERVISORS SYSTEM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Evolution of China’s PSS and Its Development 
The original purpose of the PSS was to establish a system of 
external supervision over China’s Procuratorates or prosecutors 
in the investigation of criminal cases in their jurisdiction. Article 
3 of the Criminal Procedural Law provides that police organs 
shall be responsible for criminal investigation, detention, 
execution of arrests, and preliminary inquiry in criminal cases, 
while the People’s Procuratorates shall be responsible for 
prosecutorial work such as authorizing approval of arrests and 
conducting criminal investigation of cases directly accepted by 
the Procuratorates. Under this provision, these two organs are 
vested with separate criminal investigative powers, while the 
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57. Id. art. 41(6)(1). 
58. Id. art. 41(9)(1). 
59. Id. art. 41(9)(3). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. art. 41(4) (requiring by law that the PRC has assistance of a legal advisor 
when considering the second resolution of the same case). 
62. Supreme Court of Japan, Kensatsu Shisakai: Kensatsu Shinskai Seido Q&A 
[PRC & PRC System, Q&A] (2010), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/kensin/q_a/
q3/index.html. 
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majority of ordinary criminal cases have been investigated by the 
police. 
According to Article 18 of the Criminal Procedural Law, 
China’s Procuratorates have the authority to investigate certain 
kinds of criminal offenses, including embezzlement and bribery, 
dereliction of duty committed by State functionaries, and 
violations of a citizen’s personal rights such as illegal detention, 
extortion of confessions by torture, retaliation, entrapment, and 
illegal search. 63  The Procuratorates also investigate crimes 
involving the infringement of a citizen’s democratic rights by 
government personnel who take advantage of their authority 
and power. These crimes are classified as “duty crimes.” While 
Chinese police organs accept and investigate normal criminal 
cases, Procuratorates are specifically empowered to investigate 
these duty crime cases. 
Article 8 of the Criminal Procedural Law also provides that 
“the Procuratorates in China shall, in accordance with law, 
exercise legal supervision over criminal proceedings.” In 
accordance with this provision, the Procuratorates are 
empowered to supervise the overall criminal investigation. In 
terms of normal criminal cases investigated by police organs, the 
Procuratorates supervise their investigation as well. However, 
with respect to the investigation of duty crimes, the 
Procuratorates exercise the discretion to accept and investigate 
alleged duty crimes. The Procuratorates are then required to 
supervise their own investigative activities, thereby creating what 
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63. [The Criminal Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., July 7, 1979, effective January 1, 1980; amended in accordance with the 
Decision on Revising the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
adopted at the Forth Session of the Eighth National People's Congress on March 17, 
1996), art. 18 (China). Article 18 of the Criminal Procedure Law of China provides that 
crimes of embezzlement and bribery, crimes of dereliction of duty committed by State 
functionaries, and crimes involving violations of a citizen’s personal rights such as 
illegal detention, extortion of confessions by torture, retaliation, frame-up, and illegal 
search and crimes involving infringement of a citizen’s democratic rights—committed 
by State functionaries by taking advantage of their functions and powers—shall be 
placed on file for investigation by the People’s Procuratorates. If cases involving other 
grave crimes committed by State functionaries by taking advantage of their functions 
and powers need be handled directly by the People’s Procuratorates, they may be 
placed on file for investigation by the People’s Procuratorates upon decision by the 
People’s Procuratorates at or above the provincial level. 
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the Procuratorates of China called the “self-supervision 
problem.”64 
In order to eliminate this dilemma, many Procuratorates 
have established an internal supervisory mechanism. For 
example, they have created a so-called “Department of the Duty-
Crime Investigation” in charge of solely examining duty crimes 
in its jurisdiction. Another department, named the 
“Investigation Supervisory Department,” then conducts the 
direct supervision of this department’s investigation of duty 
crimes, as well as other normal crimes that were also investigated 
by the police. This “internal supervision” of duty crime 
investigations in the same Procuratorate division may give rise to 
serious ethical concerns about the efficacy of institutional 
transparency and effectiveness of supervision because the power 
of prosecution without proper supervision may inevitably lead to 
misuse and abuse. The absence of an independent oversight 
committee has already led some prosecutorial personnel to 
commit various forms of misconduct during the process of 
criminal investigation, including illegal detention and extortion 
of confessions by torture.65 
In this context, the PSS was finally introduced by the 
Chinese government, attempting to place the Procuratorates’ 
criminal investigations under external supervision by a select 
group of citizens chosen from the local community. China’s 
authorities expected that the PSS could serve and function as a 
new normative supervisory mechanism and offer a more rigid 
and transparent procedure of duty crime investigations. 
The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China in 2002 first introduced the proposal to initiate judicial 
reform in China. This proposal was, in part, the state’s response 
to extensive media attention on people’s concerns about the 
fairness and justice of law enforcement by the Procuratorates. A 
poll initiated by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (the 
“SPC”) pointed to the instances of injustice and 
inappropriateness in the investigation of numerous duty crimes 
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64. Jiao Youlong, The Supervisory Power Needs to be Supervised, 2 PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 
RES. 16 (2004). 
65. Id. 
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conducted by the Procuratorates.66 At the same time, the SPC 
contended that some negative opinions and remarks about the 
Procuratorates could be attributed to the public’s 
misunderstandings of the nature of the investigative process and 
procedure. The SPC then decided to introduce the PSS as an 
external organ to monitor the Procuratorates’ duty crime 
investigations. 67  After reporting to the National People’s 
Congress (the “NPC”), the Supreme Procuratorate held the 
“Meeting on the Experimental Work of the People’s Supervisor 
System” in Beijing on August 29, 2003, and officially decided to 
introduce the PSS.68 
The PSS was thus expected to externally monitor and 
oversee the discretion of investigative power of prosecutorial 
personnel and their activity. The extensive supervision of 
prosecutorial conduct and decisions by a select group of citizens 
was expected to prevent procedural misconduct in law 
enforcement and even the miscarriage of justice. 
Prominent scholar Liu Wei once summarized the impact 
and effect of the PSS in the following way. First, China’s reforms 
of its judicial system and judicial working mechanisms 
unavoidably require the introduction of more public supervision 
over the judicial process to ensure justice. The PSS may 
effectively urge the Procuratorates to subordinate their work 
pursuant to due procedure and process. Second, the PSS 
becomes the inevitable creation of Chinese authorities’ policies 
to promote active civic participation in the justice system. A 
number of foreign countries have recently adopted a variety of 
systems by which civilians are encouraged to participate in legal 
decision-making, thereby eradicating the professional monopoly 
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66 . The Supreme Procuratorate of China specifically issued the so-called 
“Regulations Regarding the Prevention and Correction of illegal extended detention 
during the Procuratorial Process” in 2003, which has partially witnessed the above-
named illegal detention problem; for the phenomenon of extortion of confession by 
torture, see high-profile cases on China’s main news websites such as  “The Police 
Officer Lei Ting’s Torture Case.” [The Police Officer Lei Ting’s Torture Case], SINA.COM 
(Sept. 16, 2011, 6:54 AM), http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2011-09-16/065423164313.
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67. Chen Weidong & Sun Hao, The Research Report on the Operation of the People’s 
Supervisor System, 5 J. NAT’L INST. PUB. PROSECUTORS CHINA 81 (2011). 
68. [The People’s Supervisor System], BAIDU.COM, http://baike.baidu.com/view/
852736.htm (last visited on Feb. 3, 2014). 
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of the judicial and prosecutorial duties. 69  The Chinese 
government also realized that the professionalization of the 
judiciary had widened the distance between the community and 
the judicial process and undermined the perceived credibility of 
China’s criminal justice institutions. Not only does the PSS 
promote active citizen participation in the administration of 
justice, but it also allows the public to observe and assess the 
activities of Procuratorate personnel and prosecutorial decision-
making processes. Third, the PSS becomes the formally 
established, external institution which is placed outside the 
influence of Procuratorate division. The PSS is solely composed 
of citizens chosen from local communities. Putting the 
prosecutorial power under people’s close supervision provides 
an effective deterrent to the potential abuse and misuse of 
prosecutorial power and authority. 
B. The Evolution of the PSS and the Nation-Wide Implementation 
SPC Chief Prosecutor Jia Chunwang proposed the 
establishment of the external supervisory system over China’s 
Procuratorates. In April 2003, the SPC decided to begin 
exploring the possibility of implementing the PSS.70 On August 
29,2003, the SPC held a conference to formulate the pilot study 
of the PSS. In October 2003, the SPC finally began the pilot 
work of the PSS in ten provinces and municipalities, including 
Fu Jian, Sichuan, Heilongjiang, Liao Ning, Tian Jin, Inner 
Mongolia, Hebei, Shan Dong, Zhe Jiang, and Hu Bei.71 
To facilitate the pilot study, the SPC enacted “The 
Regulations Regarding Implementing the PSS in Criminal Cases 
Directly Investigated by Procuratorates (Provisional)” on 
October 15, 2003 (the “Regulations 2003”). The SPC held two 
workshops in Beijing and Chengdu in January and May to 
further facilitate the pilot program through exchanging 
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69. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems as Deliberative 
Agents of Social Change: De-Colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory Democracy, 86 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789 (2011); Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, Jury Selection and Jury Trial in Spain: 
Between Theory and Practice, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585 (2011); Stephen Thaman, 
Questions of Fact and Law in Russian Jury Trials: The Practice of the Cassational Courts Under 
the Jury Laws of 1864 and 1993, 72 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT PÉNAL 415 (2001). 
70. [The People’s Supervisor System], supra note 68. 
71. Id. 
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information, sharing experiences, and analyzing the problems 
they encountered in the program. 
After the workshops, the People’s Supervisor Office was 
established under the General Office of the SPC and began to 
collect information and data from the pilot studies on a monthly 
basis, such as the selection and appointment of the people’s 
supervisor, their performances, and the types of cases in which 
they participated. The People’s Supervisor Office also regularly 
distributed reports to strengthen communications among 
different Procuratorates and offer the SPC’s suggestions and 
recommendations on the PSS operation. By the end of 2004, the 
pilot study helped select a total of 18,962 people’s supervisors to 
participate in the pilot program and these Chinese citizens 
supervised the conclusion of 3341 criminal cases.72 
In 2006, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China issued “The Decision to Further Strengthen the Work of 
the People’s Courts and the People’s Procuratorates” and 
reaffirmed China’s supreme authorities’ strong commitment to 
the PSS. The Procuratorates in He Bei, Inner Mongolia, 
Heilongjiang, Jiang Su, Fu Jian, Shan Dong, Hunan, and 
Guangxi provinces first tried to facilitate the PSS’s formal 
institutionalization.73 The local Procuratorates in Tianjin, Hebei, 
Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Hubei, Sichuan, and Yunnan 
also established their own People’s Supervisor Office to 
specifically administrate the implementation of the PSS.74 In 
2006, all Procuratorates that had previously run the pilot 
program created the working mechanism to collect and archive 
information on PSS cases in order to further strengthen the 
effective civic supervision of prosecutorial personnel and their 
activities. 
In 2007, the SPC conducted a series of nationwide 
fieldworks in order to analyze and assess the difficulties found in 
the pilot program.75 In 2008, the SPC also collected feedback 
and suggestions from various Procuratorates with respect to the 
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72. STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE, BUILDING OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN CHINA 
(2005), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Oct/145718.htm#11 (the 
excerpt is found in the section, “System of people’s supervisors”). 
73. [The People’s Supervisor System], supra note 68. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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selection and appointment of the people’s supervisors, their 
performance, and supervisory activities. The State Council of 
China also issued a white paper titled Building of Political 
Democracy in China, which specifically commended the PSS: 
People’s supervisors are selected at the recommendation of 
various organs, groups, institutions and enterprises, with 
such major duties as conducting independent appraisals 
and submitting supervisory comments on cases the 
procuratorial organs have directly placed on file for 
prosecution but have later decided to withdraw or halt the 
prosecution of, and in cases of refusal to submit to arrest.76 
The white paper further extends the power of supervisors to 
examine duty crimes, in which the supervisors “participate, 
upon invitation, in other law-enforcement examination activities 
organized by the people’s Procuratorates regarding crimes 
committed by civil servants, and make suggestions and 
comments on violations of law and discipline discovered.”77 
In 2008, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China again requested the collection of information and data 
from the pilot work. The purpose was to push this system’s 
legalization, define the procedural activity of the people’s 
supervisor, improve the administration of selection and 
appointment processes, and enhance the PSS’s oversight 
functions and efficiency.78 
After seven years’ worth of pilot study, the forty-fifth 
conference of the eleventh Procuratorial Committee of the SPC 
approved The Regulations Regarding the Application of the PSS 
of the Supreme Procuratorate of China (the “Regulations 
2010”) on October 26, 2010. The SPC then issued a notice to 
promulgate the Regulations 2010 and implemented the civic 
oversight institution in the whole country.79 
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III. CIVIC REVIEWS OF PROSECUTORS’ NON-INDICTMENT 
DECISIONS 
This Section examines the civic review of prosecutors’ non-
indictment decisions in Japan and China. Two criminal cases 
reviewed by the PRC in Japan include: (1) the Fukuchiyama-
Line derailment accident; and (2) the killing of an Okinawa 
youth by US military personnel. The criminal cases reviewed by 
the PSS in China include: (1) a bribery of a public official by a 
corporate executive; and (2) the dereliction of duties by police 
officers. 
A. The PRC and Lay Adjudication of Non-Indictment Cases in Japan 
1. The Fukuchisen Derailment Incident 
Japan’s most explosive case on the disagreement between 
the prosecutorial decision and the PRC’s deliberative outcome 
involves the 2005 train derailment that killed 107 people and 
injured 555 others. The train derailment occurred on April 25, 
2005, on the West Japan Railway (“JR West”) Fukuchiyama Line 
in Hyogo Prefecture. The crowded morning train took a tight 
curve at excessive speed and slammed into a high-rise residential 
complex. Five of the seven cars derailed, and both the first and 
second cars slammed into an apartment building near the 
tracks. The first car crashed into a multi-story parking garage on 
the ground floor of the apartment and was compacted to half its 
original length, while the second car rammed into the building 
wall and was fractured into an L shape.80 
JR West operates in western Honshu, the main and largest 
island of Japan, and is one of Japan’s largest corporations. While 
JR West has been listed on all major stock markets, including the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, the company has also been burdened by 
huge debt sustained before the privatization of the Japanese 
National Railways (“JNR”) in 1987. Its managerial team has 
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80. JR West, Victims’ Relatives Mark Amagasaki Crash, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 26, 2005, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/10/26/national/jr-west-victims-relatives-
mark-amagasaki-crash/#.U26ksYFdWSo. 
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been known to be highly aggressive and concentrated on 
operations, with profit making being the highest priority.81 
On July 8, 2009, the prosecutors indicted the JR West 
President Masao Yamazaki after concluding that the tragedy 
could have been prevented if the curve had been equipped with 
the Automatic Train Stop (“ATS”) system that could have halted 
the train. He was indicted on charges of professional negligence 
resulting in deaths and injuries. 82  Yamazaki made the 
announcement, on the same day of his indictment, that he 
would resign his post, while he continued to remain on the JR 
West’s Board of Directors.83 
The prosecutors also decided not to indict former JR West 
executives in charge of safety measures, three former managers, 
and the twenty-three-year-old driver who was killed in the 
wreck.84 In August, families of victims submitted a complaint to 
the Kobe PRC, indicating that JR West past presidents should be 
indicted because of their collateral failure to install an advanced 
version of the ATS system at the site.85 On October 22, the Kobe 
PRC decided that three past presidents of the JR West should be 
indicted and submitted their recommendation to the Kobe 
Prosecutor’s Office.86  The Kobe PRC also determined that the 
major factor contributing to the accident was the company’s 
management policy that made profits, not the safety of its 
customers, the “firm’s top priority.”87 
On December 4, after brief investigative work on the case, 
the Kobe prosecutors announced that they would not indict 
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81. JR West to Pay 44.4 Bil. Yen Under New Legislation, HIGHBEAM BUS. (Nov. 12, 
1998),http://business.highbeam.com/435559/article-1G1-53249649/jr-west-pay-444-
bil-yen-under-new-legislation. 
82 . JR West President Indicted Over Crash, JAPAN TIMES, July 9, 2009, http://
archive.today/DTEY. 
83. He was later acquitted. See Editorial, Former President’s Acquittal Doesn’t Lessen 
JR’s Responsibility for Disaster, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Jan. 12, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/
article/views/editorial/AJ201201120048. 
84. JR West President Indicted Over Crash, supra note 82. 
85. Amagasaki Crash Kin Push for Charges, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/08/22/national/amagasaki-crash-kin-push-for-
charges/#.U26l4IFdWSo. 
86. Crash Inquest Panel: Indict Ex-JR West Heads, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/10/23/national/crash-inquest-panel-indict-ex-jr-
west-heads/#.U26mIIFdWSo. 
87. Editorial, JR West’s Actions Show Lack of Remorse, Resolve, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 
24, 2009, http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/3576007. 
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three former presidents, indicating that these presidents bear no 
direct responsibility for instituting an advanced version of the 
ATS system at the curb of the derailment.88 
In January, victims’ families filed another complaint 
regarding the prosecutors’ non-indictment decisions against the 
three JR West presidents.89 On January 19, 2010, regarding the 
two former transportation managers, the Kobe PRC rendered a 
“the non-indictment is improper” decision and sent the 
recommendation to the prosecutors. 90  Regarding the three 
former JR West presidents, however, the PRC summoned 
victims’ families and solicited their opinions on the case.91 The 
prosecutors were also summoned to explain the non-indictment 
decision and their own investigation on the case.92 
On March 26, 2010, the Kobe PRC decided for the second 
time that the three former JR West presidents should be 
indicted for professional negligence resulting in deaths and 
injuries. 93  On April 23, 2010, three court-appointed lawyers 
formally filed charges against the three presidents for their 
failure to take railway safety measures, thereby causing the fatal 
train derailment.94   
In March 2013, the trial of three past presidents began at 
the Kobe District Court.95 The lawyers who acted as prosecutors 
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88. JR Nishi no Rekidai 3 Shacho, Futatabi Fukisoni, Dassenjiko de Kobe Chisai [Non-
Indictment Again for Three Past JR West Presidents, on the Derailment Incident, by the Kobe 
Prosecutors], NIKKEI NET, Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/main/20091204
AT5C0401S04122009.html. 
89 . Fukuchiyamasen Dassenjiko: Kensatsu Shinsakai Izoku kara Ikenchoshu 
[Fukuchiyama Derailment Accident: The PRC Listens to Victims’ Families], EXCITEBLOG, 
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://u23pbzpv.exblog.jp/10103774/ [hereinafter Fukuchiyamasen]. 
90 . Moto Unyu Bucho Fukisowa Futo [Improper Non-Prosecution for Former 
Transportation Managers], JICHI TSUSHIN, Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=
201001/2010012900757. 
91. Fukuchiyama-sen Jiko: JR Nishi Rekidai 3 Shacho no Kisogiketsu: Kobe Daiichi 
Kensatsu [Fukuchiyama-Line Derailment Incident: Kobe PRC Decides on Indictment Against 
Three JR-West Presidents], MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 26, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/
jiken/news/20100326k0000e040081000c.html. 
92. Id. 
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94. JR Nishi no Rekidai 3 Shacho o Kyosei Kiso, Apr. 26, 2010, SANKEI NYUSU, 
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/trial/100423/trl1004231600009-n1.htm. 
95. Mottomo Omoi Kei o: Izokura Genkei ni Tsuyoikitai [Heaviest Penalty, Please’ 
Expectation for Severest Penalty by Victims’ Families], SANKEI NEWS-WEST, Mar. 27, 2013, 
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/west/west_affairs/news/130327/waf13032712010009-
n1.htm. 
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under the revised PRC Law sought three-year terms for each of 
them, arguing that the three defendants “‘cannot evade 
criminal responsibility’ for the accident because they prioritized 
business interests over ensuring the safety of the passengers.”96 
The testimony revealed that one of the key reasons that “the 
driver was speeding was because he overshot his time at the 
previous station and was making up for it to keep up with the 
pressure of the very strict timetable that JR West follows.”97 The 
busy train schedules were specifically created during the terms 
of these three former presidents.98 In September, the three-
judge panel acquitted the three former presidents of the charge 
of professional negligence of their duties.99 
While the PRC’s decision condemned the company’s 
corporate culture and management policies that put profit as 
the company’s first priority, the court indicated that the driver 
was at fault for failing to brake at the curve and that, at the time 
of accident, the company was not yet required to install the 
computerized ATS system, and even then, derailment accidents 
caused by high speeds were a rare occurrence.100 The court 
decision refused to determine corporate culpability in the 
accident and put the blame upon the driver, who had died in 
the crash.101 
2. The Killing of an Okinawa Youth by US Military Personnel102 
In January 2011, a vehicle driven by a twenty-three-year-old 
US military employee, Rufus J. Ramsey III, from an Army and 

96. Ida Torres, EX-JR West Heads Could Get 3 Years in Jail for 2005 Train Crash, 
JAPAN DAILY PRESS (Mar. 28, 2013), http://japandailypress.com/ex-jr-west-heads-could-
get-3-years-in-jail-for-2005-train-crash-2826009 (quoting the lawyers). 
97. Ida Torres, Ex-JR West Presidents Acquitted over 2005 Fukuchiyama Train Disaster, 
JAPAN DAILY PRESS (Sep. 27, 2013), http://japandailypress.com/ex-jr-west-presidents-
acquitted-over-2005-fukuchiyama-train-disaster-2736745/. 
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101. In October 2013, prosecutors filed an appeal with the Osaka High Court. See 
Faith Aquino, Prosecutors Appeal Against the Acquittal of Former JR West Executives, JAPAN 
DAILY PRESS (Oct. 8, 2013), http://japandailypress.com/prosecutors-appeal-against-the-
acquittal-of-former-jr-west-executives-0837311. The high court has yet to rule on the 
appeal, as of January 27, 2014. 
102. Beigunzoku, Kisosoto Chiikyotei ga Hikokusekini [‘Indictment is Proper’ for Military 
Employee: SOFA is on Defendant’s Seat], OKINAWA TIMES, May 29, 2011. 
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Air Force Exchange Service (“AAFES”) in Okinawa, swerved 
into oncoming traffic, striking a compact car and killing the 
nineteen-year-old driver Koki Yogi, who had just returned to his 
hometown in Okinawa to attend the official adulthood 
ceremony of his twentieth birthday organized by the local 
municipal government.103 Ramsey was on his way home after he 
had consumed alcohol at an official party at the military base 
prior to the accident.104 
After the investigation by the Naha District Prosecutors 
Office, prosecutors announced that they would not indict 
Ramsey because the accident occurred while he was still on 
official duty, citing Article 17 of the US-Japan Status of Forces 
Agreement (“SOFA”) that gave the US military the primary 
right to exercise jurisdiction over all accidents or crimes 
committed while on official duty. 105  The US military then 
decided to punish Ramsey for the accident and revoked his 
driving privileges for five years.106 
Yogi’s mother soon filed a complaint with the Naha PRC in 
order to review the prosecutors’ non-indictment decision.107 The 
PRC was composed of eleven citizens chosen from among 
Okinawa’s residents. In May, the Naha PRC reversed the 
Japanese prosecutors’ refusal to indict Ramsey, determining that 
the indictment was proper for the given case. The PRC cited the 
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103. Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, AAFES Employee Indicted in Fatal Collision, 
STARS & STRIPES (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/news/aafes-employee-
indicted-in-fatal-collision-1.161616. 
104. Drinking at USF ‘Official Event’ Is Regarded as Part of ‘Official Duty, JAPAN PRESS 
WKLY. (Apr. 24 & 26, 2011), http://www.japan-press.co.jp/modules/news/index.php
?id=1784. 
105. See id. The term, SOFA (or US-Japan SOFA in this Article), refers to the 
Agreement under Article VI of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and 
the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United 
States Armed Forces in Japan. See Agreement Between the United States of America 
and Japan Concerning New Special Measures Relating to Article XXIV of the 
Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and 
the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 25, 2008, Temp. 
State Dep’t No. 08-36, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
108914.pdf. 
106. See Tritten & Sumida, supra note 103. 
107 . Beigunzoku Fukiso Izoku, Kenshin ni Fufuku Mōsitate [Victim’s Family File 
Complaint to the PRC Against the Non-Indictment of American Military Employee], RYUKYU 
SHIMPO (Apr. 25, 2011), http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-176467-storytopic-
111.html. 
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1960 US Supreme Court decision that excluded the civilian 
employees and contractors of US military bases and dependents 
of military service members from military rules and regulations 
governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the 
“UCMJ”), thereby excluding Ramsey from the privileges granted 
under the SOFA provision.108 The PRC also reasoned that the 
NATO SOFA signed with European countries similarly extends 
no right for the US military to exercise its jurisdiction over 
civilian military employees during peacetime.109 Furthermore, 
the US government promulgated the Military Extra-Territorial 
Jurisdiction Act (the “MEJA”) in 2000, specifying that the 
federal, not the military, court has the right to exercise its 
jurisdiction over military employees’ crimes during peacetime.110 
Meanwhile, friends of the victim and grassroots 
organizations in Okinawa created the support group called Yogi 
Koki-kun no Izoku o Sasaerukai (the Support Group for the 
Survivors of Mr. Koki Yogi), collected signatures from the public, 
began to protest against the prosecutors’ non-indictment 
decision, and demanded the immediate modification of the 
Japan-US SOFA over the jurisdictional provision.111 
On November 23, the Japanese and US governments 
announced that they had reached a new agreement that allowed 
Japanese courts to try civilian military employees even if they 
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6861.html (citing the article from Okinawa Times about the ruling of the Korean 
Supreme Court Case involving the adjudication of crimes committed by an American 
military employee). 
110. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–
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were on official duty at the time of a crime or accident.112 
Specifically, the new agreement allows US authorities to, first, 
determine whether or not they will bring criminal prosecution 
to a case and, second, notify the Japanese side of their decision. 
If US authorities decide not to prosecute their personnel, the 
Japanese authorities can then request a trial within thirty days 
after the US notification.113 Two days after the new agreement 
was reached, the Naha prosecutors’ office indicted Ramsey, who 
worked at a supermarket inside Camp Foster.114 In February 
2012, the Okinawa court sentenced Ramsey to eighteen months 
in Japanese prison for vehicular manslaughter.115 
In this case, the prosecutor’s office in Okinawa never 
publicly responded to the PRC’s first recommendation for the 
prosecution. Instead, the Japanese government technically “took 
over” the case and began directly negotiating with the US 
military as to the proper disposition of the US military employee 
whose juridical rights were “protected” by the SOFA. If the 
Okinawa prosecutors had responded to the PRC decision and 
issued the non-prosecution decision for the second time, the 
deceased’s mother would have certainly filed another complaint 
to the Naha PRC for a review, and then the Naha PRC would 
have issued the second and binding decision on the prosecution. 
This would then have led to an inevitable legal controversy over 
international disputes concerning the right to exercise primary 
jurisdiction. The bilateral discussion between the Japanese and 
the US governments was absolutely necessary to avoid 
international legal controversies and politically sensitive 
jurisdictional disputes over military personnel and their crimes 
committed overseas. 
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B. The People’s Supervisor System and Lay Adjudication of Criminal 
Cases in China 
1. Bribery of Public Officials116 
After the PSS was established in 2010, people’s supervisors 
reviewed a variety of criminal cases. The following case involves 
the bribery of a government official by a corporate executive, 
and people’s supervisors were asked to review the propriety of 
the prosecutor’s non-prosecution decision on the case. 
Zhang, the General Manager of the X Electric Company, 
bribed Vice-Governor Xu twice, in 2009 and 2011. In return, Xu 
provided the X Electric Company the electric project in an 
alcohol-liquor trading center in the Y Town. The local 
Procuratorate in Sucheng District investigated the case and 
concluded that Zhang had indeed bribed Xu and therefore 
committed a crime of bribery. According to the Criminal Law of 
China, both the company and individuals who conspired and 
committed the act of bribery should be properly punished. 
Article 142 of the Criminal Procedural Law of China also 
stipulates, “with respect to a case that is minor where the 
offender need not be subject to criminal punishment or may be 
exempted from it under the Criminal Law, the People’s 
Procuratorate may decide not to initiate a prosecution.” After 
their investigation, the local Procuratorate decided not to 
initiate a public prosecution against Zhang because the bribery 
committed by Zhang had been “minor” due to a number of 
mitigating circumstances, including: (1) the monetary 
benchmark for a Procuratorate to place a legal person’s bribery 
case on file was CNY¥200,000, while the bribery in this case was 
CNY¥300,000, “slightly” above the benchmark; (2) this bribery 
case did not cause any substantial economic loss to any party 
involved in the illegal scheme; (3) Zhang surrendered himself 
on his own initiative and already confessed to his crime and thus 
his guilt; and (4) he returned all illegal earnings from this secret 
financial transaction.117 
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116 . Zhu Jianzhong & Wang Yu, The People’s Supervisor Feel Cases’ Pulse, 
PROCURATORIAL DAILY, Sept. 23, 2013, at 7. 
117. Id. 
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According to Article 17 of the Regulations 2010, if a 
Procuratorate decides not to initiate a prosecution, the people’s 
supervisor will be summoned to review the case. The 
Administrative Office of the People’s Supervisor of the Suqian 
City Procuratorate randomly selected a panel of three people’s 
supervisors (Q, W, and Y) from the candidate list to examine the 
bribery case. 
During the deliberation, the supervisor W indicated that 
the briber deserved a criminal punishment and that his 
conviction would set a good example for future lawbreakers. By 
contrast, the supervisor Q, who was a businessman, stated that 
the suspect bribed the town governor not for his own personal 
gain but for the sake of his company’s economic welfare, and 
running a company has become increasingly difficult today due 
to severe market competitions. Taking mitigating circumstances 
into account, Zhang’s crime, as viewed by the local 
Procuratorate, had been “minor” and thus leniency should be 
applied. The people’s supervisor Y agreed with Q. Finally, the 
majority of the supervisory panel decided on the verdict that 
agreed with the local Procuratorate’s decision and concluded 
that the non-prosecution against Zhang was a proper decision in 
this case. 
2. The Dereliction of Police Duties118 
On March 15, 2005, prisoner Chen, who had received a ten-
year imprisonment sentence, was sent to the hospital for 
medical treatment of his injured hands. Two police officers, M. 
Wang and Y. Wang, were dispatched to watch over the prisoner. 
The police officers cuffed Chen’s feet at the hospital, but not his 
injured hands. The officers then failed to follow the proper 
protocol to monitor and watch over Chen. In the evening of 
April 1, both officers left their watching position to have their 
dinner, leaving Chen alone in the ward of the hospital. The 
prisoner soon destroyed the cuff with a brick and escaped the 
hospital, though he was caught the next morning. 
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Chapter IX of the Criminal Law of China for the 
Crime of Dereliction of Duty and Article 400 stipulates 
that: 
a judicial officer who, due to serious negligence of his duty, 
causes a suspect for a crime, defendant or criminal in 
custody to escape shall be sentenced to a fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years of criminal 
detention if a serious result is not caused; and if an 
especially serious result is caused, to a fixed-term 
imprisonment of not less than three years and not more 
than ten years.  
The local Procuratorate initiated the criminal investigation on 
April 13 and ended it on May 8, and the case was forwarded to 
the Prosecution Department of the local Procuratorate. The 
Prosecution Department examined the case and held that two 
police officers failed to properly perform their duties and left 
their watching positions concurrently without proper 
authorization, which resulted in the prisoner’s escape. However, 
the Prosecution Department decided not to prosecute the two 
suspects by classifying this case as “minor,” taking into account 
the mitigating circumstances, including: (1) the prisoner was 
arrested the next day, and he did not engage in action that 
caused any significant societal harms; (2) the two officers 
reported on their own initiative about the prisoner’s escape; and 
(3) they already admitted their guilt. 
As stipulated by Article 17 of the Regulations 2010, this case 
was put under review by a people’s supervisor panel composed 
of five supervisors. The prosecutorial personnel reported to 
people’s supervisors about the facts, evidences, applicable laws 
of the case, information on mitigating circumstances, and 
evidence on any serious results related to personal injury and/or 
property loss in the case. After the deliberation, four supervisors 
made a verdict against the local Procuratorate’s non-prosecution 
decision, while one waived his/her rights to vote on this issue. 
Four supervisors unanimously held that two suspects were 
irresponsible in failing to uphold their duties and should be 
prosecuted. 
Article 33 of the Regulations 2010 provides that the 
Procuratorate handling the case shall examine the opinions and 
decision presented by the supervisory panel. If the chief 
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prosecutor disagrees with the decision of the supervisory panel, 
the case shall be submitted to the Procuratorial Committee of 
the local Procuratorate for further discussions and a final 
decision. In this case, the supervisor panel composed of five 
people’s supervisors disagreed with the proposal made by the 
Prosecution Department of the local Procuratorate who planned 
not to initiate a prosecution against the two derelict police 
officers, while the Chief Prosecutor of the local Procuratorate 
disagreed with the verdict presented by the supervisory panel. 
This case was thus subsequently submitted to the 
Procuratorial Committee of the local Procuratorate for 
discussion and final decision. After hearing the reports by the 
prosecutorial personnel and the opinions of the people’s 
supervisors, most members of the Procuratorial Committee held 
that the prisoner who escaped the hospital had previously 
committed serious crimes and had received a ten year prison 
sentence, and that the irresponsible actions of the two officers 
who had allowed such a dangerous prisoner to escape should 
constitute a serious dereliction of their police duties. The 
Procuratorial Committee thus approved the verdict of the 
people’s supervisors, and the local Procuratorate, under the 
final decision of the Procuratorial Committee, then initiated a 
prosecution against the two police officers. 
While the three-member supervisory panel of the bribery 
case agreed with the Procuratorate’s decision not to prosecute a 
business executive, the five-member supervisory panel that 
evaluated public servants’ crimes ruled against the non-
prosecution decision made by local prosecutors. Did the 
makeup of the supervisory panel contribute to the difference in 
verdicts? Did the socio-political background of people’s 
supervisors influence the verdict patterns? How was the 
candidate list of people’s supervisors assembled and 
constructed? The following Part examines some unique 
characteristics of grand jury systems adopted in East Asia and 
assesses the selection and appointment procedures as to 
whether or not the panel of grand jurors represents a fair cross-
section of the communities, thereby influencing the nature of 
deliberations and thus the verdicts. 
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IV. UNIQUE FEATURES OF TWO GRAND JURY SYSTEMS IN 
JAPAN AND CHINA 
This Part identifies and examines important features of 
grand jury systems adopted in Japan and China. First, we 
examine the ability of these civic panels to institute an effective 
check over prosecutorial power and authority. The second sub-
section focuses on the selection of civil panels and examines 
their representativeness. While the candidates for Japan’s PRC 
are required to be chosen from local electoral rolls, a candidate 
list of China’s PSS is constructed through a series of solicitations 
for supervisor candidates from various governmental organs, 
groups, institutions, and private enterprises. 119 The 
representative disparity of civic panels, if any, is the focus of the 
second sub-section. 
A. People’s Check on Prosecutorial Power and Authority 
The most significant difference between the two grand jury 
systems adopted in Japan and China and the US-style grand jury 
system is that the former institutions are specifically designed to 
review and examine the propriety of the decisions made by the 
prosecutor. Specifically, the grand jurors in East Asia examine 
criminal cases that prosecutors have decided not to prosecute. 
Their verdicts can potentially challenge and even reverse the 
decision made by the prosecutor. 
The United States’ grand jury system, on the other hand, 
rests on the assumption that a panel of local residents is asked to 
make an indictment decision based on evidence presented and 
produced by the prosecutor. No defense attorney is present in 
the grand jury proceeding. Grand jurors have little to no 
authority to challenge or investigate the authenticity of 
prosecutorial evidence in terms of how it is collected and how 
witnesses are identified and prepared for testimony. Thus, most 
grand jury decisions in the United States usually result in the 
indictment of the accused as requested by the prosecutors. In 
Arizona, for example, in 1994, the federal grand juries returned 
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119. STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE, supra note 72 (“People’s supervisors are 
selected at the recommendation of various organs, groups, institutions and enterprises 
. . . .”). 
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indictment decisions in 99.6% of the cases.120 In Georgia, grand 
jurors vote in favor of indictment in 90% of the cases.121 The 
high rate of indictment decisions is a reason that the grand jury 
in the United States has been referred as a so-called “rubber-
stamp” institution. 
Two East Asian grand juries, however, pay no attention to 
already indicted cases, or are not involved in making an 
indictment decision in the first instance. Rather, their 
involvement concerns the critical evaluation of the prosecutor’s 
failure or “refusal” to issue an indictment decision. As stated 
earlier, nearly all indicted cases in Japan result in criminal 
conviction.122 China has a nearly identical criminal conviction 
rate.123 In 2009, for example, one year prior to the nation-wide 
implementation of the PSS, China had a conviction rate of 
99.9%. 124  In 2013, China convicted more than 840,000 
defendants, and found 2162 defendants not guilty (99.8%).125 
Once the prosecutorial process is initiated in both countries, the 
conviction becomes a matter of reality for nearly all criminal 
suspects and defendants. The near-perfect conviction rate also 
implies that the potential abuse and misuse of prosecutorial 
power lies in the exercise of their discretion in decisions not to 
prosecute individuals, groups, or organizations that are 
suspected of criminal offenses and illegal activities. The 
prosecutor’s “failure” to issue an indictment or the prosecutor’s 
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120. A.O. Kime, The Arizona Country Grand Jury, A Former Grand Juror’s Assessment of 
the Grand Jury System, MATRIX MNEMOSYNE, http://www.matrixbookstore.biz/grand_
jury.htm (last visited May 2, 2014) (“In a shocking statistical report for fiscal 1994 
found the federal grand juries returned indictments in 99.6% of the cases.”). 
121. How Does the Grand Jury Work?, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Sept. 25, 2005), 
http://savannahnow.com/stories/092505/3317013.shtml. 
122. Norimitsu Onishi, Coerced Confessions: Justice Derailed in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/world/asia/07iht-japan.1.5596308.
html?pagewanted=all. 
123. Jeff Chinn, Intl. Wrongful Convictions: China Suspects Presumed Guilty Before 
Trial, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 20, 2013), http://californiainnocence
project.org/blog/2013/05/20/intl-wrongful-convictions-china-suspects-presumed-
guilty-before-trial (reporting the Guardian article, indicating that 99.9% of China’s 
criminal cases in 2009 ended in convictions). 
124. Patrick Boehler, Supreme People’s Court Judge Urges End to Wrongful Convictions, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/1232279/supreme-peoples-court-judge-urges-end-wrongful-convictions. 
125. Concerns Over 98% Chinese Conviction Rate, SCOTSMAN (Jan. 25, 2014), http://
www.scotsman.com/news/world/concerns-over-98-chinese-conviction-rate-1-485728. 
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“refusal” to initiate the prosecution against the suspected party 
may be caused by many factors, including the sheer lack of 
material and/or forensic evidence, the refusal of a key witness to 
testify, as well as extra-judicial pressures and/or political 
interference from private sectors, corporations, fellow 
prosecutors, government executives, or strong advocacy groups, 
i.e., public and private interest groups. 
The provision of Shobun Seikun in Japan provides an 
excellent example of how political pressures from government 
executives affect the prosecutorial decision-making process. This 
legal provision, for example, allows a complete administrative 
“takeover” of the case by prosecutorial executives and has 
resulted in the dismissal of many political cases.126 For public 
prosecutors to initiate any action against influential bureaucrats, 
political party members, or local government leaders, the 
Prosecutor General must receive an order from the Ministry of 
Justice to investigate and file a formal charge against them.127 
Thus, the Public Prosecutors Office becomes directly subject to 
a politician who happens to be the Minister of Justice, who is 
also appointed by the Prime Minister of the same political party. 
In political cases, partisan politics and ministerial influences and 
interference are inevitably present in the process of making the 
final indictment decision. 
Despite the prosecutor’s limitation in not prosecuting 
government bureaucrats and party elites for political reasons, 
Japan’s prosecutors still have tremendous power and authority, 
even more than their US counterparts. Their power to 
investigate to prosecute covers nearly all phases of the criminal 
justice process and thus has the potential for abuse and misuse. 
For example, Japanese prosecutors have the power to terminate 
or initiate the prosecutorial process, without the need to go 
through a criminal grand jury or similar screening mechanism 
as required in the United States; the authority to interrogate and 
even extract confessions from the accused or defendant in most 
criminal cases; the power to lead investigations from the 
discovery of a crime; the power to control access to evidence by 
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126. DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN 
JAPAN 131 (2001). 
127. Id. 
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defendants and their attorneys; and the authority to appeal 
acquittals rendered by court or lay judges.128 
China’s prosecutors similarly enjoy a wide range of 
unfettered power and authority. Unlike public prosecutors in 
the United States or other western legal jurisdictions, the 
Chinese Procuratorates’ work is not limited to prosecutorial task 
or duty. Chinese Procuratorates enjoy power not only to 
conduct criminal investigations, but also to exercise supervision 
of other criminal justice managers and institutions, including 
the police, prisons, detention facilities, and reform-through-
labor institution activities.129 Chinese Procuratorates also hold 
power to supervise even the courts to ensure that their judicial 
activities confirm to law.130 Chinese Procuratorates, in other 
words, exercise significant power and authority to supervise 
criminal, civil, and administrative trials.131 
It is no surprise that a powerful trans-national organization, 
or even prominent domestic political institutions such as the 
United States-led SCAP in post-war Japan, and the National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, the highest political 
organ in China, recognized the danger of potential abuse of 
power and authority by the prosecutors. In a sense, the 
emergence of two grand jury systems in Japan and China may 
have been the inevitable consequence of political concerns 
about the potential abuse of prosecutorial power and authority. 
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128. Kent Anderson, The Japanese Way of Justice: An Up-Close Look at Japan’s Jack 
McCoy: A Review of the Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. 
& POL’Y J. 169, 173 (2003). 
129. [Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates] art. 5 (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980, 
amended by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People's Cong., Sept. 2, 1983); Civil 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 14 (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008). 
130. Jingjing Liu, China’s Procuratorate in Environmental Civil Enforcement: Practice, 
Challenges & Implications for China’s Environmental Governance, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 47 
(2001). 
131. Id. 
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B. The Selection and Appointment of the PRC and People’s Supervisors 
1. Japan’s PRC Selection 
In Japan, the Prosecutorial Review Commission Office (the 
“PRCO”), a governmental administrative office, is responsible 
for the selection of PRC members. The PRCO is located in the 
same courthouse in which the PRC deliberation takes place. 
Throughout the selection process, the PRCO provides direct 
and indirect assistance in the procedural steps leading to the 
selection of the final PRC members and its foreperson. To be 
qualified for the PRC duty, one must be enlisted in the local 
electoral roll, meaning that a PRC candidate must be a Japanese 
citizen and over twenty years of age. The PRC Act tries to ensure 
that procedural methods and selection mechanisms achieve a 
broad and cross-sectional representation among its members.132 
The PRC Act specifies that the director of PRCO shall first 
determine an approximate number of PRC members needed for 
the following year and a specific allocation of prospective PRC 
members to be selected from each village, town, and city within 
the court’s jurisdiction.133 At the second selection stage, each 
allocation of PRC members is reported to the relevant local 
electoral administrative commission.134 Prospective members are 
divided into four different reserve pools, each consisting of at 
least one hundred prospective jurors.135 At this stage, based on 
the number of prospective PRC members for each geographical 
unit, the election administrative commission selects PRC 
candidates from their electoral register, creating “the Proposed 
List of PRC Candidates,” and sends this list to the PRCO.136 The 
selected candidates are contacted by the election administrative 
commission and screened for their qualifications.137 
The PRC Act stipulates that PRC members serve on the 
commission for six months, with about one-fourth of the eleven 
members being replaced every three months. In the actual 
selection of PRC members, the director of the PRCO randomly 
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132. PRC Act, supra note 28, art. 13(2). 
133. Id. art. 9(1). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. art. 9(2). 
136. Id. art. 10(1)–(3). 
137. Id. art. 12(4). 
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selects five jury candidates from the first reserve by December 
28, six jury candidates from the second reserve by March 31, five 
candidates from the third reserve by June 30, and six candidates 
from the fourth reserve by September 30 of each year.138 
Once PRC members appear at the courthouse, the chief 
justice of the court or the superior court judge instructs them 
about their duties and administers an oath.139 A PRC foreperson 
is then appointed to lead the deliberation.140 The role of the 
PRC foreperson is similar to that of the American jury 
foreperson who acts as the leader of discussions and 
deliberations in criminal and civil jury trials in the United States. 
Given the lengthy commitment of PRC duty and the 
rigorous selection procedures governing the preparation of the 
PRC candidate list and qualified pool, past research has shown 
that the composition of PRC members has failed to represent a 
fair cross-section of the community. In Japan, a preliminary 
study has found that PRC members are more likely to be male 
and in their forties and fifties.141 The overwhelming majority of 
them were also employed when they served. Many worked for 
organizations that continued to pay their salaries, including the 
government and large firms.142  Jury research in the United 
States also found that US jurors also tend to be middle-aged, 
white-collar workers in a stable primary labor market, and of 
higher income, showing similar representative disparities and 
social inequities on the basis of age, gender, and social class.143 
As for their political affiliation and views, the majority of 
PRC members indicated their support of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (“LDP”) (53.6%).144 In 2006 when the survey 
was conducted, the support for the LDP in Japan was a mere 
38%, suggesting that many PRC members were politically 
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138. Id. art. 13(1). 
139. Id. art. 16(1)–(4). 
140. Id. art. 15(1). 
141. Fukurai, supra note 18, at 334–36 (summarizing the research on civic 
participation in Japan). 
142. Id. 
143. HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 64 (1993). See generally HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD 
KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION (2003).  
144. Fukurai, supra note 18, at 334–36. 
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conservative. 145  Indeed, nearly one half of PRC members 
indicated that they were also conservative in their political views 
(48.9%).146 
While there is no known study that has examined the 
demographics of all PRC members, there may be serious 
concerns about the underrepresentation of Japan’s ethnic 
minorities such as Burakumins (Japan’s so called untouchables), 
Ainus, Koreans, Chinese, Brazilians, and descendants of 
immigrant groups from Southeast Asia and the Middle East.147 
As the same ethnic groups make up a rather sizable segment of 
criminal defendants, it may be important to research the PRC’s 
ethnic makeup and explore ethnic diversity of PRC 
membership. 
2. China’s People’s Supervisors Selection 
Article 4 of the Regulations 2010 provides for the 
qualifications of the people’s supervisors, which include: (1) 
upholding the Constitutional Law of China; (2) having the right 
to vote and to be elected; (3) twenty-three-year-old or above; (4) 
being fair and honest and holding appropriate educational 
levels; and (5) being healthy. Article Five further provides that 
the following individuals are not qualified to serve as people’s 
supervisors: (1) having a criminal record or being involved in a 
criminal procedure as a suspect; (2) having the record of 
indoctrination through labor; and (3) being discharged or 
nominally expulsed from public employment. Article 6 provides 
that the persons below are also unsuitable for people’s 
supervisors: (1) principals of the Party Committees, the 
governments and the sections thereof; (2) members of the 
Standing Committees of the People’s Congress; (3) in-service 
staff of the people’s law courts, the people’s Procuratorates, 
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145. Asahi Shimbun Emergency Opinion Poll on the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
Presidential Election, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Sept. 20–21), 2006, available at http://
mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinion-
poll-database/listofpolls/2006-polls/asahi-shimbun-emergency-opinion-polls-on-the-
liberal-democratic-party-ldp-presidential-election-06-9 (stating that 35% of citizens said 
that “they do not support any party”). 
146. Fukurai, supra note 18, at 334–36. 
147. See generally JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY (Michael 
Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009) (seeking, in part, to evaluate the construction of the Japanese 
identity and the life of minorities in contemporary Japan). 
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public security organs, national security organs, or judicial 
administrative organs; (4) practicing lawyers and people’s 
assessors (China’s jurors); and (5) any others whose posts may 
affect their performance of the duties of the people’s 
supervisor.148 
Articles 7 through 12 of the Regulations 2010 specify the 
selecting method of the people’s supervisor. Article 7 provides 
that the provincial (municipality) Procuratorate be responsible 
for the selection of the people’s supervisors for Procuratorates 
of different levels in the same province (i.e., municipality). In 
other words, a people’s supervisor for a city-level or regional-
level Procuratorate will be selected and appointed by the 
provincial-level Procuratorate, i.e., the administratively superior 
Procuratorate. It was expected that the selection of the people’s 
supervisors by the Procuratorates at a comparatively higher level 
would significantly enhance their authority when they serve at 
various local Procuratorates. This vertical selection system also 
creates a dilemma that “the supervisees choose supervisors to 
supervise the supervisees themselves.”149 This has become one of 
the most prominent problems faced by the PSS. 
Article 9 of the Regulations 2010 also stipulates that 
candidates be identified, either by self-nomination or by 
nomination from governmental institutions, public 
organizations, enterprises, and public-service institutions, with 
the candidates’ consent. This selection system creates a number 
of problems for the sufficient procurement of people’s 
supervisors. First, this “nomination” model is premised upon the 
assumption that candidates are sufficiently enthusiastic to 
nominate themselves for civic duty and that these private and 
public institutions are willing to nominate their own employees 
or members for people’s supervisors. The Regulations 2010 also 
established a five-year tenure for people’s supervisors and allows 
one more extended term, if so desired. Such a long tenure (i.e., 
five or even ten years) may scare away potential volunteers from 
serving as people’s supervisors. Second, it is doubtful as to 
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148 . Regulations on the Application of the People’s Supervisor System 
(promulgated by the Supreme Procuratorate of China, Oct. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.sx.jcy.gov.cn/rmjdy/201104/t20110429_536760.shtml.  
149. Li Li, The People’s Supervisors System Has Not Avoided the Dilemma of “Self-
supervision”, LEGAL DAILY, Mar. 9, 2012. 
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whether self-nomination can ensure a sufficient diversity or fair 
representativeness for the pool of people’s supervisors. In other 
words, a person in full employment will be less likely to 
nominate themselves, because once appointed, they will have to 
serve for five years and will have to respond to the 
Procuratorate’s summons at any time. The role of people’s 
supervisors appears more suitable for those without full-time 
employment such as pensioners, the unemployed, even the 
wealthy with sufficient leisure time, or civil servants who may 
easily ask for leave to serve on civic duty. Thirdly, in terms of 
employer nomination, it is unlikely that employers will be willing 
to lend their employees to the Procuratorates because they still 
have to pay their wages while they are serving as supervisors. 
Governmental organizations, enterprises and public-service 
institutions have been so inactive in nominating candidates that 
there have not been sufficient numbers of candidates. The 
number of self-nominated candidates has also been extremely 
limited. An alternative solution adopted by various 
Procuratorates is that the Procuratorates themselves seek 
candidates or even “procure” candidates by trying to persuade 
people to serve as supervisors. Such a selection method certainly 
leads to the loss of randomness or lack of broader 
representativeness of the community members. For example, it 
has been reported that some Procuratorates tend to choose 
employees working at governmental institutions because their 
bosses are more likely to deem the civic services as “working for 
the state” and easily give their subordinates a leave permit.150 
The Supreme Procuratorate has not published the latest 
socio-demographic information about supervisors, such as their 
occupations, educational levels, gender, and so forth. We, 
therefore, can only speculate on these characteristics, based on 
published statistical data. According to the report published by 
the Supreme Procuratorate of China in 2006, 20,848 people 
served as supervisors in China. Among them, 12,520 were the 
representatives of the NPC (equivalent to the Upper House) or 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
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150. Yang Zhi, The Investigation Report of the People’s Supervisors System—
Sampling the Procuratorates in the Autonomous Region of Hong He Hani and Yi 
Ethnic Minorities (May 2008) (unpublished LL.M. degree dissertation) (on file with 
the second author). 
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(“CPPCC”) (equivalent to the Lower House) (60.1%); 6958 had 
law diplomas or degrees (33.4%); and there were only ninety-
nine workers (0.4%) and 293 farmers (1.4%).151 
According to another report from scholar Yang Zhi in 
Honghe District of Yunan Province, seventy-eight served as 
people’s supervisors in 2007. Among this pool, fifty-seven were 
Chinese Communist Party members (73.1%); four were 
politically affiliated with other parties (5.1%); and seventeen had 
no political affiliation (21.8%). In terms of occupation, forty-
eight worked in governmental institutions (61.5%); ten came 
from non-governmental organizations (12.8%); sixteen were 
from state-owned enterprises or public-service organizations 
(20.5%); three were members of grass-root organizations 
(3.8%); and there were only two blue-collar workers (2.5%) and 
one farmer (1.2%).With respect to their education background 
and political affiliation, thirteen graduated from law schools 
(16.6%); five had working experience in the legal profession 
(6.4%); thirty-two were members of the CPPCC (41.0%); and 
one was the representative of the NPC (1.2%).152 
These findings suggest the following characteristics of 
people’s supervisors: (1) the political accountability of the 
people’s supervisors has been much emphasized, and it was 
evidenced by the high proportion of Communists, governmental 
employees, and representatives from the NPC and the CPPCC in 
the pool of people’s supervisors; (2) law school graduates 
occupy a considerable proportion of the pool of supervisors, 
suggesting that the highly educated have been given preferential 
consideration in the process of people’s supervisors’ selection 
and that the people’s supervisors are commissioned to supervise 
the legality of criminal investigations; and (3) people from 
comparatively lower social classes such as blue-collar workers 
and farmers are not welcome candidates for people’s 
supervisors, which might be attributed to such factors as their 
absence of political commitment or their lack of legal 
knowledge required for deliberations. In general, the personnel 
structure of the people’s supervisors in China tends to draw 
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those who are more likely to be senior, elitists in their 
professions, and government-affiliated personnel. 
CONCLUSION 
Both Japan and China recently introduced a new grand jury 
institution in their legal system. These two East Asian grand 
juries are designed to examine those criminal cases in which 
prosecutors have decided not to prosecute the suspect. In Japan 
and China, where nearly all of prosecuted cases result in 
conviction, the potential abuse and misuse of prosecutorial 
power and authority may lie in the exercise of the discretion not 
to prosecute individuals, groups, or organizations that are 
suspected of illegal activities. 
We examined a total of four specific cases in which East 
Asian grand jurors reviewed and deliberated. We also identified 
unique features of East Asian grand juries as compared to their 
American counterparts. The grand juries adopted in Japan and 
China had problems with respect to selection and appointment 
procedures and we found that the grand jurors were less likely 
to reflect a cross-section of the general population. Unlike their 
American counterparts, East Asian grand jurors were not chosen 
on the basis of rigid randomized design. While Japan’s other lay 
participation system, called Saiban-in system (a panel of three 
professional and six lay judges), relies on the system of random 
selection in identifying the jurors, the PRC has no such strong 
mandate regarding the use of randomized method throughout 
the selection of grand jurors, i.e., from the identification to the 
final stage of appointment at the courtroom. Both self-
nomination and individual or institutional referrals have been 
used for the selection of China’s people’s supervisors. Because 
of the reluctance on the part of self-nominating individuals or 
employers to lend their employees to civic duty, the 
Procuratorate offices have been proactively soliciting a large 
number of supervisors to serve in their cases. 
It is advisable to reform the selection process of the grand 
jury systems adopted in Japan and China in order to ensure the 
randomness of juror selection. If these grand jurors are 
primarily selected from certain gender, age, social classes or 
political groups, their representativeness will inevitably become 
unbalanced and skewed. The selection and appointment 
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methods adopted in Japan and China, coupled with a long 
serving tenure (i.e., six months for Japan’s PRC members and 
five years for China’s supervisors, whose term can be extended 
to a total of ten years), is apt to turn the grand jurors’ service 
into an avocation enjoyed only by a tiny privileged number of 
volunteers who feel happy to be nominated, rather than 
ensuring a democratic right and social responsibility enjoyed 
and assumed by all of the citizenry. 
  
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